

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

June 14, 2013

TO: S. A. Stokes, Acting Technical Director
FROM: M. T. Sautman and D. L. Burnfield, Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Savannah River Site Weekly Report for Week Ending June 14, 2013

The Board Vice Chairman, Jessie Roberson, visited SRS this week to discuss potential safety impacts related to budget cuts, the SRNS maintenance program, recent conduct of operations issues, and implementation of Recommendation 2012-1 *Savannah River Site Building 235-F Safety*.

Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL): The site reps and the radiological protection manager walked down the 776-A Radioactive Liquid Residue Handling Facility, locations where plastic containment is used, and several inactive facilities: the Separations Equipment Disassembly (SED) Facility, the Californium Packaging Facility (CPF), the Medical Source Facility, and the Alpha Decontamination and Disassembly Facility. As noted previously (12/22/06 report), plastic and/or tape are used to contain contamination in cabinets and cells in SED and CPF. In several locations, the tape had peeled away from the equipment or plastic bag. This could allow contamination to spread in the future. The site reps also checked on: 1) how SRNL monitors the integrity of the elastomers used in the old gloveboxes in SED, 2) the storage of flammable materials inside gloveboxes, and 3) why radiological conditions have worsened in some SRNL locations.

Training: The site rep observed an oral board for a shift manager (SM) of H-Area New and Old Manufacturing. The oral board could have been improved in several significant ways had the board members followed the guidance provided in DOE Handbook 1080-97, *Guide to Good Practices for Oral Examinations*. For example, not all of the reference materials were provided. The use of the simulator for conducting the board would provide a setting that is more representative of the area that the SM will be working and make it easier for the board to provide all the needed reference materials. The specific questions to be asked along with the expected responses for a satisfactory examination could be prepared ahead of time. This aids in the conduct of the board as well as in determining whether the candidate's response was adequate.

H-Canyon: During a diesel generator loss of power test, a breaker failed to close causing two safety-class exhaust fans to shut down. SRNS did not detect any spread of contamination into clean areas as a result of this reduced ventilation condition.

Saltstone: After reviewing various options, SRR is planning to install an elastomeric roof coating to the six south cells of Vault 4. Rainwater infiltration and reliability issues with the cell drain water systems are resulting in contamination leaching out of the vault. Before applying the coating, SRR would pour clean grout in the cells to reduce the dose rates on the vault's roof. In addition, facility representative questions led to the discovery that the flanges in the Saltstone Disposal Units 2, 3, and 5 safety-significant (SS) passive vents were not actually SS.